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1. Introduction 
 
This empirical study analyses the relationship between ownership structures in large European 
companies and their search for innovation in terms of R&D spending. The ownership 
structures of European companies have experienced radical changes since the early 1980s 
with the arrival of institutional investors. Institutional investors today hold on average 50 to 
60 percent of the capital of large listed European companies and have increased their presence 
at the expense of ‘strategic’ investors such as families, industrial corporations and state or 
government agencies. Concomitant with the presence of institutional investors, a controversy 
has arisen as to their influence on the ‘financialisation’ of company strategies (Froud, Haslam, 
Johal, Williams, 2000; Williams, 2000; Lazonick & O' Sullivan, 2000) and on the innovative 
effort of companies in particular. This issue had already arisen in another context, the 
American case, a few years earlier. In the early 1990s, many scholars attempted to explain the 
decline of U.S. competitiveness by focusing on the influence of institutional investors on the 
innovative effort of companies. As an illustration, the work of Porter (1992) explained the 
decline of U.S. competitiveness, in the late 1980s, by the presence of institutional investors 
considered as ‘myopic’ actors seeking only short-term returns. Today, the decline of 
European competitiveness has become a key issue for industrial policies and in a context of 
slower growth many questions arise about the systems of corporate governance that could 
promote innovation.  
Since one major dimension of corporate governance concerns the ownership structures of 
companies, our study focuses on the relationship between ownership structures and corporate 
innovation strategies. We ask: Who owns companies? Do all shareholders exercise the same 
influence on the innovation activity of publicly traded companies regardless of their type, 
nationality or time horizon? And what is the effect of ownership concentration on R&D 
spending? 
A number of theoretical and empirical studies have already been carried out on the 
relationship between ownership structures and R&D investments but these studies were 
performed almost exclusively in the U.S. context and have produced conflicting results. The 
first group of studies considers that institutional investors are only motivated by the quest for 
short-term returns and do not encourage managers to become involved in long-term strategies 
of innovation, which are risky and uncertain by nature. According to this ‘myopic viewpoint’, 
institutional investors do not encourage innovation (Drucker, 1986; Mitroff, 1987; Graves, 
1988; Graves, Waddock, 1990; Jacobs, 1991; Porter 1992). The second group supports the 
thesis that institutional investors look for long-term gains and invest in firms that are more 
innovative (Jarrell, Lehn, Marr, 1985; Allen, 1993). Finally, the hypothesis of ‘myopia’ has 
been challenged by a group of studies reporting that institutional investors, because they hold 
large stakes in corporations, monitor managers and pressure them to increase long-term 
investments such as R&D (Baysinger, Kosnik, Turk, 1991; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Useem, 
1993; Kochar & David, 1996; Zahra, 1996; Wahal, Mc Connell, 1997; David, Hitt, Gimeno, 
2001; Chen, Harford, Li, 2007; Aghion, Van Reenen, Zingales, 2010).  
Other studies have focused on another level of analysis claiming that institutional investors do 
not constitute a homogeneous group. These studies have stressed differences among investors 
in terms of their time horizons or activism in corporate governance (Roe, 1991; Black, 1992). 
Different typologies of investors have been proposed including Brickley, Lease & Smith 
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(1998) and Chen et al. (2007) which we refer to in our study. Chen et al. (2007) compare 
‘grey’ and ‘independent’ investors to assess the influence of different types of investors in 
corporate governance. ‘Grey’ owners such as banks, insurance companies, endowments, 
foundations or private pension funds have a greater potential of close business relations with 
companies they have invested in and are less likely to challenge managers’ decisions. On the 
contrary ‘independent’ owners, like mutual funds or public pension funds, have no business 
relationship with companies and will be much more active in terms of corporate governance.  
Since almost all studies focus on the U.S. market, their central issue deals primarily with the 
influence of different types of institutional investors on innovation. In the European context 
however, ‘strategic’ entities still hold an important share of companies’ capital, even in large 
firms with more dispersed ownership (see tables 2, 2, 2’’). Such an institutional context is an 
opportunity to raise an additional question. While in the U.S. context the main issue is 
whether one type of institutional investor is more favourable to innovation than others, in the 
European situation it is important to assess whether institutional owners are better at 
encouraging innovation than other investors and ‘strategic’ investors in particular. The data 
we have gathered allow us to address this issue, along with more classical ones such as the 
influence of ownership concentration, time horizons or the nationality of investors.  
To build our European sample, we have focused our attention on the most highly innovative 
European companies. They can be easily identified thanks to the EU Industrial R&D 
Investment Scoreboard of the European Commission. This annual ranking of the top 1000 
European companies investing in R&D accounts for a very large part of European R&D. Our 
sample is made up of 324 companies that are present in every Scoreboard’s ranking from 
2002 to 2009, providing 2525 firm-year observations. We merge these R&D figures with 
financial and ownership data provided by Thomson Financial databases.  
Our study extends prior research by making empirical and methodological contributions and 
is original in several respects. The study does not focus on the sole influence of institutional 
investors on R&D but incorporates the role of ‘strategic’ investors that characterize the 
European institutional context. It tests different dimensions of ownership on R&D: the type of 
investor (institutional investors versus ‘strategic’ entities, ‘grey’ versus ‘independent’ 
investors), their past portfolio turnover (‘patient’ versus ‘impatient’ investors), their 
nationalities and ownership concentration. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study to 
test the influence of so many variables of ownership on R&D with a transnational perspective, 
on a large sample of companies for an 8-year period. To explain the R&D effort of 
companies, we use a standard dynamic investment equation augmented with variables 
designed to control for the specific determinants of R&D investment. We use a method to 
control for endogeneity that is known to be robust for dynamic models: the Blundell-Bond 
difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). It correctly addresses the bias that could 
come from the inverted direction of causality between institutional stock ownership and R&D 
spending. 
We report that firms have higher R&D ratios when their ownership is dominated by 
institutional investors but lower R&D ratios when ‘impatient’ institutional investors (i.e. 
investors seeking short-term profits) dominate ownership. More precisely, we show that 
institutional investors’ domination has a positive impact on R&D provided that the blocks of 
shares held by ‘impatient’ investors are not too large. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews prior studies on the relationship 
between corporate ownership and R&D. Section 3 describes our data, variable definitions and 
our methodology. Section 4 presents our econometric results. Section 5 concludes our study. 
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2. Corporate ownership and R&D 
 
Our study refers to two types of work: 1) works focusing on the relationship between 
innovation and corporate ownership as a potential influential form of corporate governance; 
and 2) works based on typologies of investors to provide a better understanding of the 
relationship between ownership structures and R&D. 
 
2.1. R&D, an investment that generates divergences between stakeholders 
 
Since the seminal work of Schumpeter (1942), it is recognized that investments in innovation 
are crucial to economic development and companies’ growth. At the discretion of the 
entrepreneur or management, R&D investments involve risks and temporal trade-offs: 
investments are carried out in the short term whereas outcomes and payoffs are uncertain and 
generated over the long term (David et al., 2001). In line with the Schumpeterian theory of 
innovation, economists have argued that the large size of a company and internal finance were 
important determinants of the success of R&D projectsi. Although many empirical studies 
have been conducted on the effects of financial constraints on innovation (e.g. Hall, 2002; 
Bond & Van Reenen, 2007), there are fewer studies on the relationship between ownership 
structures and R&D. 
Ownership structures and R&D investments are two issues often analysed in the agency 
theory framework. R&D investments are uncertain and subject to both asymmetric 
information and moral hazard (Hall, 2002; Aghion et al., 2010). On the one hand, it may be 
difficult for managers to propose a total disclosure of R&D projects to outside investors. 
Indeed, conveying too many details of R&D investments may affect the firm’s competitive 
advantage (Lee & O’Neill, 2001). On the other hand, it may be difficult for external investors 
to supply finance if R&D projects are misunderstood because too opaque. Moreover, the 
evaluation of an R&D project generally involves technical or scientific skills and it can be all 
the more difficult for investors to evaluate projects when companies decline to fully reveal the 
information necessary to assess the real value of innovation (Mina, Lahr, Hugues, 2012). 
From an agency theory perspective, a company’s investment in R&D is a decision that may 
induce either manager-shareholders conflicts or conflicts between shareholders (through an 
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholdersii). The seminal works 
of Berle & Means (1932) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) have underlined the separation of 
ownership and control that induces potential conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders. Shareholders are supposed to be interested in maximizing the long-term value of 
their investments (Useem, 1993). R&D strategies are by nature uncertain and risky, but 
shareholders whose portfolios are efficiently diversified will be able to spread this risk 
(Markowitz, 1952). Shareholders may thus be less risk-averse regarding innovation because a 
decline in one of their investments will not greatly affect the overall value of their portfolios: 
investment in R&D is a high risk/return strategy attractive to investors able to reduce risk by 
keeping diversified portfolios (Franko, 1989; Baysinger et al., 1991; David et al., 1996). 
Managers, on their part, may pursue different objectives including the running of the 
company, job security, compensation, personal wealth, desire for prestige, etc. Because 
managers work for a single company, they have undiversified portfolios which may lead them 
to favour less risky strategies. They may have a general aversion to innovation because of the 
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risk of managerial turnover: if R&D projects conclude with failure the board of directors can 
dismiss managers (David el al., 1996; Kaplan & Minton, 2012; Aghion et al., 2010). 
Managers may thus prefer lower-risk strategies with low-variance returns and favour projects 
with short-term rather than long-term payoffs (Hill & Snell, 1988; Baysinger et al., 1991; 
David et al., 1996).  
However, the argument according to which the main purpose of companies should be to 
maximize shareholder value has been questioned by studies trying to propose a theory of 
innovative enterprise (Lazonik & Sullivan, 2000; O’Sullivan, 2000; Carpenter, Lazonick, 
O’Sullivan, 2003; Lazonick, 2009). According to these authors, the agency theory framework 
is not relevant to explain the process of innovation because it fails to understand under what 
conditions the allocation of resources really supports investments in R&D. Yet, this ideology 
of shareholder value has developed worldwide, since the 1980s, leading large companies to 
massively distribute corporate revenues to shareholders in the forms of dividends or buybacks 
instead of fully reinvesting their profits. In their analysis of the innovation process defined as 
inherently uncertain, Lazonik & O’Sullivan (2000), O’Sullivan (2000) and Lazonik (2009) 
have emphasized the role of what they call ‘financial commitment’. Companies need a 
‘financial commitment’ or ‘patient capital’ to sustain investment in R&D that will generate 
financial returns in the future through the sales of new products. The role of finance is clearly 
to provide ‘patient’ funds able to support the duration and risks of investments in innovation. 
According to agency theory, managers should only invest in projects with ‘a positive net 
present value when discounted at the cost of capital’ (Jensen, 1986). O’Sullivan (2000) and 
Lazonick (2007) show that it may be difficult for managers to allocate resources efficiently 
because investments in innovation only generate returns in the long term. Indeed, one cannot 
guarantee financial returns to innovative investments because of their inherent risk and 
uncertainty. If managers were fully dedicated to the maximization of shareholder value, they 
would probably never invest in innovation. On their part, shareholders and institutional 
investors in particular, diversify their portfolios to minimize their risk and require financial 
liquidity whereas investment in innovation requires financial commitment. In practice, 
O’Sullivan (2000) and Lazonick (2007) show that the ideology of shareholder value has lead 
companies to use their free cash-flow to repurchase stocks or distribute dividends whereas 
they could have used profits for innovative investments. The rejection of the agency theory 
framework is thus sought to be the prerequisite for analyzing and encouraging investments in 
innovation (Lazonick, 2009). 
 
2.2. An empirical controversy: do shareholders encourage R&D? 
Empirical studies have been carried out on the relationship between ownership structures and 
R&D and have led to somewhat controversial results (see Kochar & David, 1996 for a 
survey). As the majority of studies have focused on the U.S. market, they have analysed the 
relationship between institutional investors and investment in R&Diii. 
Some studies consider that institutional investors, because they are assessed on a short-time 
basis only look for short-term gains from their investments (Drucker, 1986; Mitroff, 1987, 
Graves, 1988; Franko, 1989; Jacobs, 1991; Porter, 1992). These ‘myopic’ investors lead 
managers to underinvest in innovation that requires a long-term focus. This ‘managerial 
myopia’ has been highlighted in a number of studies to explain the declining position of some 
countries in international competitiveness (see Porter, 1992, and his analysis of the U.S. 
market). A number of empirical studies have commented on this negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and innovation (Graves, 1988; Graves & Waddock, 1990; 
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Majamda & Nagarajan, 1997; Dixon & Seddighi, 1996). Graves & Waddock (1990) have in 
particular stressed the pressure of quarterly earnings release that negatively influences the 
propensity of firms to innovate and have commented on this preference of managers for short-
term investments. The study by Lazonick (2007), even if it does not address the relationship 
between ownership structures and R&D has focused on the question: do company have 
invested enough in innovation on the U.S. market in the late 1990s? The study showed that 
large companies, under the pressure of professional investors, have committed their free cash-
flow to create shareholder value and have neglected innovation: indeed repurchases programs 
have exceeded expenditure on R&D from 1996 to 2000.  
Other studies, on the contrary, have concluded that institutional investors only look for long-
term returns and invest in companies that are more innovative (Jarrell et al., 1985; Allen, 
1993). The study by Jarrell et al. (1985) found that changes in institutional ownership were 
not associated with change in R&D spending, suggesting that institutional investors have no 
influence on corporate innovation strategies. 
Nevertheless, a large majority of studies support the view that institutional investors take a 
long-term perspective and are better at monitoring and influencing firms to be more 
innovative (Baysinger et al., 1991; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Francis & Smith, 1995; Kochhar & 
David, 1996; Zahra, 1996; Eng & Shackell, 2001; Aghion et al., 2010). This group of studies 
underlines the monitoring role of institutional investors by focusing on the relationship 
between ownership concentration and R&D investments: a higher institutional ownership is 
associated with greater innovation. According to this thesis, institutional investors do not 
select corporations with a higher degree of innovation but rather pressure managers to become 
involved in strategies for innovation. Institutional investors have incentives to monitor 
managers and favour R&D projects: they can pressure boards of directors, exercise their exit 
options, make public announcements, and so on. The recent study by Aghion et al. (2010) 
reported a positive impact of institutional investors on R&D and on the productivity of R&D 
(measured by cited-weighted patents per R&D dollars). Aghion et al. (2010) demonstrated 
that this correlation between institutional investors and innovation is not due to a selection 
mechanism whereby investors are better at selecting companies who will innovate more in the 
future: institutional investors are active shareholders and monitor managers with a view to 
encouraging innovation. However, all these studies demonstrating a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and R&D have been realized on the US market in the late 
1980s and 1990s. One has to underline that this period was characterized by large corporate 
takeovers, and by a stock market and R&D boom that may explain part of the correlation 
found between institutional ownership and R&D (see O’Sullivan (2004), Lazonick (2007) and 
Brown et al. (2009) for empirical works on the R&D boom that has characterized the U.S. 
market during the 1990s). 
 
2.3. Typologies of investors and R&D 
Agency theory should be partially amended to acknowledge that shareholders do not all have 
the same attitude to corporate innovation strategies (Hoskisson et al., 2002). It may be 
relevant to consider investors as a heterogeneous group: because of the different legal 
constraints they face, investors have different behaviours in terms of diversification of their 
portfolios, activism in corporations or portfolio turnover (Roe, 1991; Monks & Minow, 1995). 
We believe that integrating typologies of investors should enable us to better understand the 
relationship between ownership and corporate innovation strategies. 
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Type of investors, monitoring and influencing 
Many authors have recognized that the involvement of large shareholders in monitoring and 
influencing managers has the potential to reduce agency problems (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Shleifer & Vischny, 1986; Holmström & Tirole, 1993; Hart, 1995; Maug, 1998, Auvray and 
Brossard, 2012). In fact, too dispersed shareholders will have no incentives to engage in 
monitoring because monitoring is costly and small shareholders may hope that others will 
engage in this activity. Only large shareholders have a real incentive to exercise control over 
management because unlike small shareholders, they may get a high fraction of the return 
(Holmström, Tirole, 1993; Hart, 1995). One mechanism that has really affected the 
monitoring of companies is the emergence of institutional investors (Gillan, Starks, 2000): 
institutional investors, as large blockholders, can influence managers either through internal 
mechanism of governance (board of directors or manager compensation policies) or external 
mechanisms (market for corporate control or trade of shares). 
Some studies have proposed typologies of institutional investors based on shareholders’ 
activism, activism being defined as an indicator of shareholder dissatisfaction and designed to 
bring public pressure on managers (David el al., 1996). Activism of institutional investors 
includes monitoring and attempting to bring about changes in companies that would not 
otherwise pursue the goal of maximising shareholder-value. Investors have the potential to 
influence managers by trading their shares (‘exit’ strategy or ‘voting with their feet’) or 
through their ownership (‘voicing’ their dissatisfaction). Active investors can vote against 
management at annual meetings or engage management in discussions (while making 
shareholder proposals, Gillan & Starks, 2000). Two studies have integrated this issue of 
monitoring. 
The study of Brickley et al. (1988) opposes three types of investors: i) ‘Pressure sensitive’ 
investors include banks, insurance companies and nonbank trusts. These investors have 
business relations with the firms in which they hold equities and can be reluctant to influence 
managerial decisions because they could be penalized by the firm via the withdrawal of 
business; ii) ‘Pressure resistant’ institutions are public pension funds, mutual funds, 
endowments and foundations. They have no business relationship with companies but only an 
investment relationship and can express their opinions of company actions; iii) ‘Pressure 
indeterminate’ institutions include corporate pension funds, brokerage houses or institutions 
with small holdings in the firm and their goals are not clearly defined. Brickley et al. (1998) 
conclude that ‘pressure resistant’ investors have the strongest influence on innovation and are 
in particular more positively associated with the rate of new product development. Following 
Brickley et al. (1998), Chen et al. (2007) make a clear distinction between ‘grey’ and 
‘independent’ investors. ‘Grey’ investors include actors such as banks, insurance companies, 
endowments, foundations or private pension funds. This category includes long-term 
investors who have business relationships with companies that may compromise their 
monitoring activity. ‘Independent’ investors include public pension funds and investment 
advisors who do not seek business relationships with companies and who incur the high cost 
of monitoring. In our study we will test the influence of ‘grey’ versus ‘independent’ investors 
on R&D policy to integrate this issue of activism. 
Empirical studies that have specifically tested this relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and investment in R&D have concluded that activism has significant but 
contradictory influence (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; David et al., 1996, 2001; Ortega-
Argilès, Moreno, Caralt, 2005). They have obtained that i) the presence of outside directors 
on boards leads companies to reduce investment in internal innovation (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990); ii) the activism of institutional investorsiv is positively associated with 
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R&D inputs (David et al., 1996, 2001); or iii) the inclusion of owners in the management of 
corporations lowers the probability of adopting R&D projects (Ortega-Argilès et al., 2005). 
 
Strategic versus institutional investors 
‘Strategic’ investors include families, industrial corporations and state or government 
agencies. As individual investors, much of their wealth may be invested in a single company. 
They are not engaged in a strategy of diversification of their portfolios as professional fund 
managers might be and may thus be more risk-averse to certain decisions such as investments 
in R&D. Institutional investors, on the other hand include mutual funds, public and private 
pension funds, trust funds, private equities, foundations, etc. Because they manage investment 
for the benefit of others, institutional investors are required by law to hold diversified 
portfolios (Roe, 1991) and have a fiduciary obligation to maximize long-term value (Davis & 
Thompson, 1994; David et al., 2001). Institutional investors are not sensitive to the decision 
of investment of a single company that would only slightly affect the performance of their 
overall portfolio and may not be reluctant to invest in companies engaged in innovation.  
‘Strategic’ investors are historical reference shareholders in many European countries such as 
France where, as majority shareholders, they may hold a large fraction of sharesv. Institutional 
investors, meanwhile, are the reference shareholders of Anglo-Saxon countries, with U.S. 
institutional investors holding 60% of the capital of large U.S. companies (Hawley & 
Williams, 2000; Aghion et al., 2010). To the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated 
the relationship between ‘strategic’ versus institutional investors and R&D. Our study is 
original because it tests the influence of these two kinds of investors on R&D investments 
while postulating i) a negative relationship between ‘strategic’ investors and R&D; ii) a 
positive influence of institutional investors on R&D. 
 
Type of investors and time horizons 
The question of time horizon is a crucial issue for an understanding of the relationship 
between investors and R&D policy. Lazonick & 0’Sullivan (2000) and Lazonick (2007) have 
emphasised the importance of ‘financial commitment’ or ‘patient capital’ to sustain 
investments in R&D. As not all investors have a long-term orientation, it is necessary to 
determine who the ‘patient’ versus ‘impatient’ investors are, in order to assess what kind of 
investor really encourages innovation. Two empirical studies that particularly focus on this 
issue of time horizon have largely inspired our study. 
The study by Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors according to their past trading 
behaviour while drawing on the typology of Porter (1992). His classification is based on three 
variables: portfolio turnover (a measure of how frequently an investor trades shares of the 
firms in its portfolio), diversification of the portfolio (a measure of whether an investor tends 
to take small ownership positions in a large number of corporations or large ownership 
positions in a small number of firms) and momentum trading (a measure of whether an 
investor increases its holding in corporations that have just announced surprise positive 
earnings and decreases its holdings in corporations with bad earnings news). Bushee (1998) 
distinguishes i) ‘transient’ investors (high portfolio turnover, high diversification and high 
degree of momentum trading) characterized by short-term horizons; ii) ‘dedicated’ investors 
(low portfolio turnover, low diversification and no trading activity for short-term earnings) 
that hold their stakes for long periods of time; iii) ‘quasi-indexer’ investors (low portfolio 
turnover, high diversification and passive buy-and-hold investing strategies). Bushee (1998) 
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demonstrates that, as a whole, institutional investors reduce incentives for managers to act 
myopically. Cuts in R&D following poor earnings performance are less likely, the greater the 
degree of institutional ownership. In particular, managers of companies with high levels of 
‘transient ownership’ face the strongest incentives to make myopic decisions: a large 
proportion of ownership by institutions that have high portfolio turnover increases the 
probability that managers reduce R&D to reverse an earnings decline.  
The study of Dupuy, Lavigne and Nicet-Chenaf (2010) provides a comparative study of 
portfolio turnover among worldwide investors. It questions the thesis that institutional 
investors require high returns on invested capital in a short time period, contributing to the 
‘financialisation’ of corporate strategies. Their study opposes ‘strategic’ investors (the state, 
families, corporations, banks and insurance companies) and institutional holders (pension 
funds, mutual funds, private equities, hedge funds, etc.). The most volatile actors are, in 
descending order: hedge funds, mutual funds, endowment funds and brokers/dealers, the least 
volatile actors being the state, individuals and corporations, whereas banks, insurance 
companies and pension funds occupy a middle position in terms of portfolio turnover. Their 
study emphasizes that American investors trade securities most frequently relative to other 
international equity investors, confirming that the United States is the archetype of ‘finance-
driven’ capitalism. The study of Dupuy et al. (2010) highlights two factors that can be central 
for understanding time horizons of investors and by extension their influence on innovation: 
the type of investor (mutual fund, pension fund, hedge funds, etc.) and its nationality. We 
believe that these two variables deserve to be included in any study seeking to analyse the 
relationship between institutional ownership and investments in R &D. 
 
Pension funds versus mutual funds 
Institutional investors differ in respect to their legal environment, modes of collecting funds 
and issuing payments, time horizons and liquidity constraints (Roe, 1990; Black, 1992; 
Goyer, 2006). In particular, pension fund and mutual fund managers have different behaviour 
detailed in the study by Hoskisson et al. (2002) who test the relationship between institutional 
holdings and investment in R&D while comparing pension funds to mutual funds. Because 
pension fund managers have to pay a retirement pension to their pensioners, they are under no 
pressure to achieve short-term returns. They operate within a regulatory framework that limits 
their holdings in companies and their compensation is not market-based (Scharfstein & Stein, 
1990; Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). Pension funds, and particularly public pension funds, are 
active in the governance of companies principally through the submission of shareholder 
proposalsvi. For these reasons, pension fund managers may focus on companies with long-
term strategies and may prefer internal innovation to external innovation through acquisition 
(Hoskisson et al., 2002). On the contrary, professional fund managers, because they are likely 
to be replaced if their performance is not sufficient in the short-term (Khorana, 1996) will 
pursue short-run horizons. Managers of mutual funds are compensated according to the size 
or net asset value of the fund. Hoskisson et al. (2002) demonstrate that mutual funds consider 
R&D investments as an expense that reduces short-term performance and will prefer external 
innovation that generates more immediate returns. 
In summary, the literature has shown that several variables can influence R&D policy, namely 
the type of investor, its degree of activism in corporations, its time horizon or its nationality. 
Rather than testing the influence of one or two variables, as it is usually the case in many 
studies, the Thomson Financial database allows us to test these four variables of ownership in 
a single study. In particular, we will assess whether i) long-term institutional investors favour 
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R&D investments; ii) ‘strategic’ investors and ‘impatient’ institutional investors negatively 
affect R&D expenditurevii. 
 
3. Data, variables and methodology 
 
3.1. The sample 
 
To study a transnational sample of European companies, no representative firm-level data is 
available. However, it is possible to identify a large sample of the most innovative European 
firms thanks to the annual EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboards prepared by the Joint 
Research Centre and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and 
Innovationviii. Every year since 2004, the EU R&D Scoreboard provides R&D expenditure for 
the top 1000 EU companies and top 1000 non-EU companies investing in R&D. The ranking 
is based on the previous year’s R&D figures, but the first ranking issued in 2004 provides 
R&D data for 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Despite its limitations due to slightly different 
national accounting standards and disclosure practices, the EU Scoreboard is probably the 
best tool for companies, investors, financial analysts, policy makers and governments to study 
R&D expenditures at a company level. The data are taken from companies’ publicly available 
audited accounts and do not include information on where R&D was performedix. Among the 
firms in the top 1000 ranking of the EU R&D Scoreboards, many are listed for only a few 
years because they do not constantly maintain a top level R&D expenditure, or because they 
disappear for other reasons (failure, mergers & acquisitions, etc.). The system-GMM 
procedure we implement to deal with endogeneity in the econometrics requires at least 4 years 
of continuous data because it uses the second lags of the variables differences as instruments. 
In order to maintain time variability in the data once these lags and differences are introduced, 
it is necessary to use as many years as possible of continuous data. Otherwise, the dataset 
would become a pseudo-panel where most of the variance would come from between-firm 
variability, whereas within- firm variability would be nearly absent. We therefore identify a 
sub-sample of 331 companies that 1) are present in every Scoreboard ranking between 2004 
and 2010x and 2) have no missing R&D expenditure figures from 2002 to 2009xi. These 331 
firms are substantial innovators since they have ranked among the top 1000 R&D firms for 
seven years (2004-2010). We merge these R&D figures with financial and ownership data 
provided by two Thomson Financial databases: Worldscope Fundamentals and Thomson One 
Banker Ownership (TOBO)xii. Ownership data are available from 2002 onwards. After 
removing seven firms for which ownership data were not available, we end up with a slightly 
unbalanced panel of 324 firms over the period (2002-2009).  
Table A1 (Appendix) shows that, according to the SIC 2-digits classification, the six most 
frequent industrial sectors in the sample are, respectively, Electronic and electric equipment, 
Chemicals and allied products, Industrial machinery and equipment, Business services, 
Transportation equipment and Instruments and related products. Considering the 4-digits 
level, the three most frequent sectors are, respectively, Prepackaged software, Pharmaceutical 
preparations and Semiconductors. Not surprisingly, firms in the ICT, Pharma-medical, 
Electronic or Automotive sectors are more frequently classified in the top 1000 R&D ranking 
and are consequently over-represented in the sample. As regards firms’ size, Table A2 
(Appendix) shows that a large proportion of the sample is made up of large-scale businesses: 
between 2002 and 2009, the smallest company of the sample never falls below 56 employees; 
only 5% of the sample have fewer than 290 employees; only 50% have fewer than 6130 
employees, 25% exceed 26,797 employees and 1% exceed 321,090 employees. This over-
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representation of large and very large businesses is not surprising in a sample of highly 
innovative firms where large automotive and pharmaceutical firms are pooled with smaller 
software and electronics companies. The distribution of firms between countries is also 
characterized by over-representation of some countries (Table A3, Appendix). Indeed, our 
data confirm that some countries lag behind in terms of their R&D effort (Spain, Greece, 
Italy, Poland) while others have a larger proportion of firms in the top 1000 R&D Scoreboard 
than might be expected regarding their size (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, U.K.).  
Even if this sample of the most innovative European firms is not representative of the whole 
European population of companies, understanding the behaviour of this particular group of 
companies is a relevant issue. According to the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission, the top 1000 companies account for a very large part of world total R&D, 
around 85% in 2009. This is an appropriate sample to analyse the behaviour of the most 
innovative European firms. 
 
3.2. Variables and descriptive statistics 
 
There are several important papers in the literature showing that R&D can be interpreted as a 
kind of investment and that the financing constraint is particular in the case of R&D 
investments (Mulkay et al., 2001; Bond et al., 2005, Brown et al., 2009)xiii. As a consequence, 
to explain the R&D effort for large European companies, we use a standard dynamic 
investment equation inspired by these studies and augmented with variables designed to 
control for the specific determinants of R&D investment. We then introduce various 
ownership variables to assess the potential impact of firms’ shareholder characteristics. 
Dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 1.  
To measure the R&D effort, the natural dependent variable is a ratio of R&D expenditure 
over a scaling variable accounting for firms’ size. Although some studies use sales or the 
number of employees as scaling variables, theoretical models of investment applied to R&D 
suggest using assets as the scale variable in R&D investment regressions (Brown et al., 2009). 
We will therefore present our results with the dependent variable (R&D expenditure / total 
assets)xiv. 
We explain this R&D effort measurement by independent variables suggested by investment 
theories. The first is lagged R&D because investment is subject to adjustment costs that create 
persistence in this variable. Moreover, innovative projects often take a substantial amount of 
time to come to fruition. Therefore, the adjustment costs of R&D may be particularly high 
(Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Hall, 2002). We employ a dynamic specification of our R&D 
investment equation requiring a specific GMM estimator. A usual explanatory variable for 
investment is Tobin’s Q. In line with many other studies, we approximate Tobin’s Q with the 
ratio (market capitalization + total debt) / (total assets). Another potentially important 
determinant of R&D investment is profitability, either because it is a measure of demand-
induced R&D investment (accelerator mechanism) or because it captures the importance of 
the financing constraint (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hubbard, 1998) or the cost of other production 
factors (Brown et al., 2009). We measure profitability with a ratio derived from firms’ income 
statement: return on sales (ros) which is the ratio (net income / sales). More precisely, we use 
one-year lagged values of this ratio in order to limit its colinearity with Tobin’s Q. Since 
expected demand may not be perfectly captured by the proxy we use for Tobin’s Q, we use a 
sales-to-assets ratio to control for demand effects on R&D and assess whether our results are 
robust to this inclusion.  
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We then introduce control variables accounting for the specificity of R&D as an investment. 
First, R&D investment is influenced by the intensity of the technological competition that 
characterizes the industry in which a company operates. To capture this effect, we use the 
standard OECD classification of industrial sectors into four technological levels (low tech, 
mid-low tech, mid-high tech and high tech). Not surprisingly, 44% of the firms in this sample 
belong to high-tech industries while only 10% belong to low-tech sectors (Table 1). Of 
course, the technological level is highly correlated to the industry classification and it is 
therefore useless to control for industry affiliation on top of that. Another important control 
variable is the size of the firm because it influences its market power, financial constraint and 
technological opportunities. Since assets and sales already serve as scaling variables, one 
cannot use them as size controls. We therefore introduce firms’ total number of employees in 
all estimated equations. We also create dummies to control for firms’ nationality (variables 
UK, German, Nordic and Latin in Table 1), and introduce year-dummies in all regressions. As 
a supplementary robustness test, we introduce control variables accounting for firms’ 
financial strategies and financial constraints: a total debt to income ratio, a balance sheet cash 
ratio, a share buyback ratio and a dividend ratio. 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Most importantly, the core innovation of this study is that we construct various measures of 
firms’ ownership characteristics and assess their influence on R&D investment. The data 
extracted from the TOBO database provide detailed information about the geographical origin 
of shareholders, their type (pension fund, hedge fund, bank, corporation, holding, etc.), their 
investment horizon (portfolio turnover) and the percentage of the firm’s shares they hold. This 
information is updated quarterly and detailed not only for the most important shareholders, 
but also for a large part of total ownership. In our sample, more than 75% of firm-year 
observations have more than 40% of their total share ownership described in the TOBO 
database. This is quite enough, as the literature on ownership structures, monitoring and 
corporate control generally considers that focusing on the five or ten most important 
shareholders is sufficient to understand the influence of significant blockholders. We build 
ownership variables considering the ten largest shareholders. Firstly, the influence of 
shareholders may be related to ownership concentration because it encourages monitoring and 
activism aiming at influencing managers’ decisions. That is why we test the two classical 
ownership concentration indices: c1 (% of shares held by the main shareholder) and c5 (% of 
shares held by the top five shareholders). Table 1 shows that, on average, ownership is fairly 
concentrated in our sample of highly innovative European firms. However, c1 and c5 have 
important standard errors. Secondly, we wanted to find out whether the national origin of 
shareholders could have an influence on companies’ R&D. We construct a measure of 
investors’ dominant origin by bringing together countries that are close in the geographical, 
linguistic or institutional dimension. The dummy duanglo has a value of one if the percentage 
of shares held by Anglo-Saxon investors among the ten most important shareholders is higher 
than the share held by European or other investors. Table 1 shows that 35% of the firms in 
this sample have ownership structures dominated by Anglo-Saxon investors while 64% have 
ownership dominated by European investors. Similarly, we create a dummy duii equal to one 
if, among the ten most important shareholders, the percentage of shares held by institutional 
investors is higher than the percentage held by strategic entities. In the TOBO database, the 
type ‘strategic’ entities refers to holding companies, individual investors, corporations or 
government agencies. Other investors are called ‘investment managers’ and are actually 
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institutional investors with a subtype label ‘investment advisors’, ‘hedge funds’, ‘banks & 
trusts’, ‘sovereign wealth funds’, ‘pension funds’, ‘venture capital funds’ ‘research firms’ or 
‘private equity funds’. On average, institutional investors belonging to the ten most important 
shareowners hold 23.7% of the total outstanding shares while strategic entities hold 20.8% 
(variables iistake and stratstake in Table 1). Ownership is consequently ‘dominated’ by 
institutional investors (duii=1) in 60% of cases, which means that there are 40% of companies 
in the sample where, among the ten largest shareholders, the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors is lower than the percentage held by ‘strategic’ entities. In this regard, 
Europe is very different from the US where institutional investors dominate ownership in a 
large majority of companies. However, Table 2 shows that whereas the first shareowner is 
frequently a strategic investor in our sample, the fifth or tenth investor is most often an 
institutional one. We also construct a variable designed to assess the influence of ‘impatient’ 
investors, impatientstake, which is the share of total outstanding stocks held by ‘impatient’ 
investors that belong to the ten most important shareholders. We consider an ‘impatient’ 
investor to be any shareholder whose portfolio turnover is qualified as ‘moderate’ or ‘high’ in 
the TOBO database. High portfolio turnover refers to a holding period of portfolios of less 
than 18 months. Moderate portfolio turnover refers to a holding period between 18 months 
and 24 months. Low portfolio turnover refers to a holding period of more than 24 months. On 
average, the share of ‘impatient’ investors is 5.2% (Table 1). Table 2 shows that ‘impatient’ 
investors represent only 11% of the first shareholders but are found more frequently among 
the fifth or tenth shareholders (respectively 23.7% and 25.5%). 
We have also attempted to introduce a variable accounting for the distinction between 
‘independent’ and ‘grey” investors. This was inspired by the studies by Brickley et al. (1988) 
and Chen et al. (2007). We therefore created a dummy variable, duindep, which is equal to 
one if ownership is dominated by ‘independent’ investors, that is to say institutional investors 
that are neither banks nor insurance companies. We see in Table 1 that the figures concerning 
the distribution of shareholdings between institutional investors and ‘strategic’ entities (duii=1 
in 60% of cases) do not differ much from the ones regarding the distribution between 
‘independent’ and ‘grey’ investors (duindep=1 in 58% of cases). Indeed, the only difference 
between these two typologies is that banks and insurance companies are always classified as 
institutional investors in the former while they are classified as ‘grey’ investors in the latter, if 
they do not hold the shares through one of their asset management branches. This case is 
extremely rare in the TOBO database where banks and insurance companies appear very 
rarely under the type code ‘Banks & Trusts’ because they are almost always asset 
management branches and hence categorized as ‘investment managers’. Using the TOBO 
database and its investor type codes therefore results in many banks being coded 
‘independent’ whereas a number of them would certainly be considered as ‘grey’ investors by 
Brickley et al. (1988) and Chen et al. (2007), even if they hold the shares through their asset 
management branches. However, we think that it is somewhat arbitrary to decide whether the 
asset management branch of a particular bank behaves like an ‘independent’ investment 
manager or rather like a ‘grey’ investor. Furthermore, this behaviour may vary with the size of 
the shareholding: a bank may act like a ‘grey’ investor when it is the first blockholder of the 
company, and like a portfolio manager when it is the fifth or tenth shareholder of the 
company. These difficulties lead us to focus on the distinction between ‘strategic’ investors 
and institutional investors rather than on the difference between ‘independent’ and ‘grey’ 
investors. As underlined in Section 2, the European case is specific and interesting because of 
the large share of stocks held by strategic entities that probably do not behave like 
institutional investors: these are holding companies, corporations, and individual investors 
whose portfolios are much less diversified than those of institutional investors. Therefore, 
there are good reasons to expect that they are more reluctant to bear the risks of long-term 
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R&D investment even if their investment horizon is always above 24 months, whereas more 
than 20% of institutional investors can be characterized as ‘impatient’ (Table 2). Tables 2’ 
and 2’’ show the nature and behaviour of the main institutional investors in our sample. 
Investment advisors (i.e. mutual funds) and hedge funds are the most frequent investors and 
represent the great majority of institutional investors (Table 2’). Whereas 20.82% of 
institutional investors registered as first shareholder are ‘impatient’ (Table 2), only 13.51% of 
private equity funds, 0% of pension funds and 3.57% of Banks & Trusts are ‘impatient’ 
investors (Table 2’’). These latter types of funds are more patient than the others. On the 
contrary, investment advisors, hedge funds and research firms tend to be more ‘impatient’ 
investors. It should also be underlined that some investors do not behave the same way when 
they are the first or only the tenth shareholder: investment advisors, private equity funds and 
banks & trusts are more ‘impatient’ when they are only the fifth or tenth shareowner and they 
are more ‘patient’ when they are the first (Table 2’’). 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLES 2, 2’ and 2’’ about here 
 
3.3. Econometric methodology 
 
In our R&D investment equations we test all the ownership variables described above (Table 
1) in order to systematically assess these various dimensions of the ownership effect. On this 
sample of firms, two ownership variables prove to have significant and robust effects on the 
R&D effort: duii, which describes whether or not the ownership is dominated by institutional 
investors, and impatientstake, which captures the influence of ‘impatient’ blockholders.  
We therefore focus on the following dynamic equation (Equation (1)):  
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whose variables have already been described above (Table 1):  
- rdtoassetit represents R&D expenditure over total assets for firm i at time t;  
- rosit-1 is the return on sales ratio computed with net income;  
- TIcontrolij represents the set of time-invariant control variables, that is to say hightech, 
German, Nordic and Latinxv;  
- TVcontrolijt is a set of time-variant controls: salestoassets, employeesxvi, debttoinc, 
cashtoinc, buybacktoinc, divtoincome;  
- yeart are time period fixed effects for the years 2002-2009;  
- duiiit is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i’s ownership is dominated by institutional investors at 
time t;  
- impatientstakeit, is the share of total outstanding stocks held by “impatient” investors that 
belong to the ten most important shareholders of firm i at time t; 
- ui is an unobserved individual effect; 
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- εit is the usual idiosyncratic error term; 
 
Several econometric problems have to be addressed when estimating such an equation. 
Firstly, the estimated standard errors have to be corrected for heteroskedasticity because of 
the structure of the panel data. This is done in all our regressions. Secondly, unobserved 
heterogeneity, in the time dimension and in the individual dimension, is a serious concern. 
Consequently, we systematically introduce time-period fixed effects in all estimations. We 
also introduce two kinds of individual fixed effects: the dummies German, Nordic, Latin 
accounting for firms’ national locations and the dummy hightech indicating whether the firm 
belongs to a high-tech industry. However, since we want to obtain estimates of these dummies 
coefficients, we cannot use simple ‘within’ estimators because they would exclude all time-
invariant dummies. Moreover, a simple ‘within’ estimator would not be appropriate for this 
dynamic equation which includes the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory 
variables. A third important econometric issue is that we suspect that an endogeneity bias 
could be generated by the fact that institutional investors select the most highly innovative 
firms to get higher returns from their investments. If such firms do more R&D than the others 
because they have high-potential research projects that we do not observe but that institutional 
or ‘impatient’ investors may be aware of, the presence of these investors will be correlated 
with the unobserved individual effect ui and possibly also with εit, the idiosyncratic error term. 
To treat this endogeneity problem, we use GMM techniques that rely on lagged values of 
independent variables to instrument the endogenous variables. We cannot use the Arellano-
Bond (1991) estimator because we wish to obtain estimates of the hightech and country group 
dummies, which is impossible with the difference-GMM approach. Blundell & Bond (1998) 
suggest a system-GMM approach in which the model parameters result from simultaneously 
estimating the equation in difference and in level, using lagged differences as instruments for 
the levels and lagged levels as instruments for the differenced variables. This method will 
offer consistent estimators of the dynamic Equation (1), provided that the ‘moment’ 
conditions are validated and that the estimated models do not exhibit order 2 serial 
autocorrelationxvii. We validate the former condition using the Sargan test, and the latter using 
Arellano-Bond tests for order 2 autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. This method has the 
great advantage of fully addressing endogeneity since it is consistent with the potential 
correlation between some selected covariates and both the individual error term ui and the 
idiosyncratic one εit. We choose to instrument the variables duii and impatientstake for 
reasons already explained hereinbefore. In the equation where we introduce supplementary 
financial controls, we also instrument the variable buybacktoinc because we suspect that it is 
correlated to the idiosyncratic error term εit since richer firms may implement supplementary 
R&D while also using their excess cash to repurchase their shares.  
 
4. Econometric estimates and results 
 
We first implement the dynamic system-GMM estimation with the main explanatory variables 
(Table 3, column 1). This specification is validated by two usual tests: the Arellano-Bond test 
accepts the hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation of the first-differenced errors. The 
Sargan test validates the over-identifying restrictions. These two tests validate all the 
specifications presented in Tables 3 and 4, which means that the equations and their internal 
instruments are correctly specified.  
The highest and most significant coefficient is that of lagged R&D to assets. In this sample of 
companies, a doubling of the R&D ratio at time t generates a 50% increase of the R&D ratio 
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at time t+1. It suggests that adjustment costs of R&D investment are rather high and produce 
a significant persistence of the R&D effort. The choice of a dynamic equation for the R&D 
investment is therefore justified. Tobin’s Q has a positive but non-significant coefficient in 
this regression and in all the other specifications presented below. However, one can verify 
that it again becomes significant if one adopts a static rather than dynamic specification of the 
R&D effort equationxviii, or if one removes the lagged cash-flow variable (return on sales). 
Therefore, Tobin’s Q is not significant, because lagged R&D and the other significant 
explanatory variables capture most of its explanatory power. The value of a one-year lagged 
cash-flow variable (rost-1) is significant positive but its impact on the R&D effort is small. On 
the contrary the fixed effect technological level hightech is positive, significant and fairly 
high in all specifications: belonging to a high-tech sector rather than to a mid or low-tech one 
leads on average to a 10% higher R&D ratio. On the contrary, the country type dummies are 
not significant in this first regression. 
Most importantly, the dummy variable duii has a positive and significant coefficient of 0.037 
which represents more than 46% of the R&D-to-assets standard error (displayed in Table 1). 
An ownership dominated by institutional rather than ‘strategic’ investors substantially boosts 
the R&D ratio in this sample of highly innovative companies. However, we also obtain a 
significant and negative coefficient of the variable impatientstake measuring the share of total 
outstanding stocks held by ‘impatient’ investors belonging to the ten most important 
shareholders. The coefficient is -0.003 which implies that a one-standard-deviation increase of 
the share of ‘impatient’ investors, that is to say a 6.7% variation of their shares, generates a 
drop of 2 % of the R&D-to-assets ratio, which has an 8% standard error. The negative impact 
of ‘impatient’ investors is not negligible.  
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
To test robustness, we first introduce the demand variable salestoassets and the financial 
controls debttoinc, cashtoinc, divtoincome and buybacktoinc (Table 1, column 2). The former 
is positive and strongly significant but the latter are not significant. Consequently, we do not 
use them further in the other specifications. In any case, inclusion of these variables does not 
change either the signs or significances previously obtained for the main coefficients. In 
particular, the two ownership measures duii and impatientstake keep their significances and 
signs. However, two variables now become significant: lemployees, which is the log of the 
number of employees and Latin, which is the dummy identifying French, Italian, Spanish, 
Greek or Belgian companies. A natural explanation for the fact that the size variable 
lemployees is, in some specifications, significant negative, is that smaller companies are 
constrained to innovate a great deal because they want to conquer markets whilst larger firms 
may benefit from various monopoly rents - for example those due to increasing returns of 
technological adoption that render the innovative effort less vital. The positive and sometimes 
significant effect of the dummy Latin has to be interpreted very cautiously. The reference 
category is the dummy UK identifying English and Irish firms. This means that, in this sample 
of companies, the Latin firms have on average higher R&D-to-asset ratios than the U.K. 
firms, but this is also the case of German and Austrian firms though the coefficient of the 
dummy German is only significant in one specification (Table 4, column 2). Moreover, we 
know from Table A3 (appendix) that Latin countries are under-represented in this sample of 
very innovative corporations. This might bias upward the coefficient of the dummy Latin.  
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A supplementary robustness test is provided in Table 3, column 3: to check that our results are 
not driven by outliers, we winsorize all the scale variables (assets and sales) used in the ratios. 
This winsorization at 0.5% on each tail of the distribution does not cause any significant 
changes. 
The positive effect of duii and the negative effect of impatientstake appear to be robust. This 
suggests that institutional investors have a positive influence on R&D when they dominate 
ownership, i.e. when they have a larger share than strategic investors among the ten first 
shareholders. Furthermore, ‘impatient’ investors have a negative influence on R&D, even if 
they hardly ever dominate ownership structures of this sample of companies (Table 2). In fact, 
all ‘impatient’ investors are institutional investors (Table 2). Therefore, the correct 
interpretation is that institutional investors’ domination has a positive impact on R&D 
provided that the blocks of shares held by ‘impatient’ ones are not too largexix.  
 
Are the results produced by reverse causality? 
One could argue that ‘patient’ institutional investors intentionally choose to hold more R&D- 
intensive stocks, meaning that this econometric result must be interpreted as evidence of the 
reverse causation going from the nature and level of firms’ investments to the nature of the 
investors they attract. We cannot totally exclude this explanation as there are good reasons to 
consider that diversified institutional investors with long investment horizons select 
companies whose investment expenditure is highly lucrative but risky and long to become 
profitable, which is particularly true in the case of R&D investments. However, why would 
such investors change their view and discourage R&D investment once they have bought the 
stocks? Furthermore, all the econometric specifications implemented in this study address the 
potential endogeneity of the two ownership characteristics duii and impatientstake. This 
means first that the level of their coefficients is not biased by this possible reverse causation. 
Secondly, since these two variables are instrumented by their lagged and differenced values, 
one cannot reject the causality going from the nature of investors to the level of R&D, even if 
one cannot exclude the reverse causation: if patient institutional investors where selecting 
R&D intensive stocks to discourage R&D once they hold the stocks, the instrumented 
versions of duii and impatientstake would not have significant positive coefficients because 
their lagged and differenced values would be correlated negatively with the R&D ratio. If 
only the reverse causation was involved, we would not obtain these signs for the variables 
duii and impatientstake instrumented this way. 
 
Does the influence of institutional investors vary with the size of companies? 
To assess whether the key results for the investor type variables differ with size, we interact 
the number of employees with the variables duii and impatientstake. For that purpose, we 
create a dummy dbig equal to 1 whenever the company belongs to the 50% of firms with the 
highest number of employees, and we interact this dummy with duii and impatientstake. The 
results provided in Table 4, column 1 show that the positive influence of institutional 
investors in comparison to strategic entities is significant whatever the firm size. However, the 
negative influence of the share of impatient (institutional) investors is significant only for the 
50% of smallest companies. First, one has to underline that in any case these are not very 
small firms as the median firm size in the sample is 6130 employees (Table A3, Appendix). 
Secondly, to interpret this latter result, we checked the shares of impatient investors in each 
size category. The average share of impatient investors is 7.1% in the smallest firms whereas 
it is only 3.3% in the largest ones. Consequently, there may be a minimum threshold of the 
share of ‘impatient’ investors to produce a negative influence on R&D. We verify this 
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hypothesis in the specification presented in Table 4, column 2. We interact the variable 
impatientstake with a dummy dhighturnov equal to one whenever the share of ‘impatient’ 
investors is above the median share observed across the sample. The negative impact of 
impatientstake proves to be significant only when dhighturnov is equal to one. In conclusion, 
‘impatient’ investors have a significant negative influence on R&D in this sample, but only in 
the firms with fewer than 6130 employees because these are the only companies where these 
investors manage to reach a stake sufficient to be influential. Smaller corporations may be 
more influenced by ‘impatient’ investors because they have smaller capitalisations and, 
consequently, more open ownership structures. In larger capitalisations, a coalition of 
‘impatient’ investors planning to grab the free cash-flow rather than invest in long-term R&D 
projects is much less feasible because ownership is necessarily more dispersed. Another 
complementary explanation is that smaller companies are probably younger on average, and 
so they rely more heavily on some external equity financing that they cannot easily replace 
with debt (Brown et al., 2009). 
 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 about here 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We estimated R&D intensity equations on 324 European firms that have been constantly 
classified between 2004 and 2010 in the top 1000 EU companies ranked by R&D expenditure 
according to the annual EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. We assembled a panel 
dataset including R&D expenditure, accounting information and ownership details for all 
these 324 firms over the period (2002-2009). 
We used this dataset to assess whether ownership characteristics have a significant and robust 
influence on the R&D effort of this sample of European companies. A preliminary review of 
the theoretical and empirical literature shows that the effect of ownership structures on R&D 
is still controversial, especially in the European case since it has been somewhat neglected by 
empirical studies. There are good theoretical reasons to suspect that corporate strategies are 
influenced by ownership concentration and investor characteristics, particularly in the case of 
long-term decisions such as R&D investment. For example, large blockholders have to 
monitor and influence managerial decisions because they have large stakes in firms’ capital 
(Holmström & Tirole, 1993, Auvray and Brossard, 2012). Investors’ country of origin may 
produce specific monitoring behaviours because of the different national legal systems 
governing asset management practices (Dupuy et al., 2010). Moreover, institutional investors 
that manage portfolios by delegation have different risk/return benchmarks than strategic 
investors whose asset allocation is necessarily oriented by business goals. One could also 
suspect that monitoring/influencing practices are different across various groups of 
institutional investors since this broad category of investors merges, for example, pension 
funds, venture capital funds, sovereign funds and so on (Roe, 1991; Monks & Minow, 1995). 
Finally, there are also some very good reasons to suspect that ‘transient’ or ‘impatient’ 
investors do not stay long enough in firms’ capital to correctly reward such long horizon 
investments as R&D expenditure (Porter, 1992, Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000).  
We exploited Thomson One Banker Ownership data to test the influence of these ownership 
characteristics on R&D intensity ratios. We found that two ownership variables have a 
significant impact that proves robust to specification tests and that resists correction of 
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endogeneity biases. The first, duii, is a dummy characterizing ownership structures dominated 
by institutional rather than strategic investors; its coefficient is positive. The second, 
impatientstake, characterizes the share of total outstanding stocks held by ‘impatient’ 
investors that belong to the ten most important shareholders; its coefficient is negative. We 
can therefore conclude that, in our sample of European firms, institutional investors seem to 
promote R&D investment while ‘impatient’ investors seem to hinder it. A comprehensive 
examination of the nature of impatient investors in this sample shows that they are not 
strategic investors, which is not surprising, but particular types of institutional investors: 
mainly mutual funds and hedge funds. Therefore, institutional investors have a positive 
impact on R&D provided that these ‘impatient’ institutional investors do not hold too large 
blocks of shares. Of course, this does not provide empirical identification of why and how 
they do so. Indeed, as argued by David et al. (2001), ownership alone may not be a sufficient 
explanation and it could be interesting to integrate the actions by which institutional investors 
exercise their influence. Other empirical studies should try and elucidate these points. One can 
easily understand that ‘impatient’ investors exert pressures in favour of strategies that produce 
immediate profitability, high stock prices and high dividends in the short run, but why would 
institutional investors support R&D expenditure more than ‘strategic’ investors? Is it because 
the former are activist investors while the latter are passive shareholders? Is it because they 
are independent outsiders while strategic investors have business ties with companies they 
invest in and therefore tend to favour manager entrenchment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989)? Or is 
it on the contrary because managers have superior ability to understand what kind of R&D 
investments are relevant but need the support of long-term institutional investors to 
implement such policies (Aglietta & Rigot, 2009; Lazonick & Prencipe, 2005)? These 
competing interpretations require further empirical investigations with more precise data on 
shareholder behaviour, manager compensation and strategic control on company boards. 
Moreover, since focusing on R&D alone may be misleading because it supposes that more 
R&D is always desirable, the same kind of test should be achieved with citation-weighted 
patents or other innovation measures to assess the effect of these two ownership variables on 
R&D productivity (Aghion et al., 2010). 
This is a challenging research program for future European projects on finance and 
innovation. 
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Variables Définitions Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
rdtoassets R&D expenses / assets 2525 0,06 0,08 0,0002 0,9839
rdtosales R&D expenses / sales 2525 0,09 0,25 0,0003 7,0291
tobinq Tobin's Q = (market capitalisation+total debt) / total asset 2519 1,38 1,13 0,25 9,88
salestoassets sales / total asset 2525 0,97 0,42 0,01 3,12
ros Return on sales = net income / sales 2525 0,01 0,33 -6,99 1,19
hightech dummy =1 if "high tech" industry according to the OECD classification 2525 0,44 0,50 0 1
midhightech dummy =1 if "mid-high tech" industry according to the OECD classification 2525 0,27 0,44 0 1
midlowtech dummy =1 if "mid-low tech" industry according to the OECD classification 2525 0,19 0,40 0 1
lowtech dummy =1 if "low tech" industry according to the OECD classification 2525 0,10 0,30 0 1
UK dummy =1 if the firm's headquarter is in the United Kingdom 2525 0,26 0,44 0 1
German dummy =1 if the firm's headquarter is in Germany, Austria, Luxembourg or Poland 2525 0,25 0,44 0 1
Nordic dummy =1 if headquarter in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Netherlands 2525 0,26 0,44 0 1
Latin dummy =1 if the firm's headquarter is in France, Italy, Spain, Greece or Belgium 2525 0,23 0,42 0 1
employees Total number of employees in the company 2525 27959,69 57646,76 56 524803
debttoinc total debt / net income 2525 3,90 65,31 -1566,82 1412,78
cashtoinc Cash in the balance sheet / net income 2525 1,42 19,53 -678,88 534,40
buybacktoinc Stock repurchases / net income 2522 0,10 1,63 -67,34 27,52
divtoincome Total dividends / net income 2522 0,26 4,22 -156,00 50,78
duii dummy =1 if ownership is dominated by institutional investors 2525 0,60 0,49 0 1
duindep dummy =1 if ownership is dominated by independent investors 2525 0,58 0,49 0 1
c1 % of total outstanding shares owned by the main shareholder 2525 20,43 17,82 0,13 90,79
c5 % of total outstanding shares owned by the five main shareholders 2528 37,47 19,92 0,4 98,57
iistake holdings of institutional investors in the ten most important shareholders (%) 2528 23,72 16,14 0 98,59
stratstake holdings of strategic entities in the ten most important shareholders (%) 2525 20,85 23,05 0 94,59
impatientstake holdings of impatient investors in the ten most important shareholders(%) 2525 5,22 6,70 0 74,71
duanglo dummy =1 if ownership is dominated by anglo-saxon investors 2525 0,35 0,48 0 1
dueurope dummy = 1 if ownership is dominated by european investors 2525 0,64 0,48 0 1
All variables are constructed yearly at the firm level for the sample of 324 firms that have been constantly classified in the top 1000 EU companies for R&D investment during 2002-2009.
Table 1:  Summary statistics of variables tested 
INDEPENDENT variables
DEPENDENT variables
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Table 2: Distribution of investors categories among the 1st, 5th and 10th main shareholders 
 institutional  strategic Impatient1 patient1 
strategic 
impatient 
strategic 
patient 
institutional 
& impatient 
institutional 
& patient 
1st shareholder 49,07% 50,93% 11,04% 88,96% 0,00% 100,00% 20,82% 79,18% 
5th shareholder 89,86% 10,14% 23,71% 76,29% 0,00% 100,00% 24,46% 75,54% 
10th shareholder 93,35% 6,65% 25,51% 74,49% 0,00% 100,00% 25,33% 74,67% 
 
Table 2’: Nature of the ‘patient’ and ‘impatient’ institutional investors of the sample 
      
Who are the impatient1 institutional investors?   Who are the patient1 institutional investors?    
% of impatient institutional 
investors whose type is:  
1st 
shareholder 
5th 
shareholder 
10th 
shareholder % of patient institutional 
investors whose type is:  
1st 
shareholder 
5th 
shareholder 
10th 
shareholder 
Investment advisors 53,15% 72,56% 68,24% Investment advisors 49,46% 54,59% 55,79% 
Hedge funds 39,37% 24,19% 26,55% Hedge funds 33,05% 32,47% 30,57% 
Private equity 1,97% 0,18% 1,01% Private equity 3,43% 0,44% 0,19% 
Venture capital funds 3,15% 0,36% 0,34% Venture capital funds 3,22% 0,88% 0,50% 
Pension funds 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% Pension funds 4,61% 5,15% 5,85% 
Banks & trusts 0,39% 1,81% 1,85% Banks & trusts 2,90% 4,08% 4,98% 
Research firms 0,79% 0,72% 1,01% Research firms 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Total 98,82% 99,82% 98,99% Total 96,67% 97,61% 97,88% 
 
Table 2’’: Time horizon of the main institutional investors of the sample  
 
1st shareholder 5th shareholder 10th shareholder 
 Impatient Patient Impatient Patient Impatient Patient 
Investment advisors 22,65% 77,35% 31,63% 68,37% 31,18% 68,82% 
Hedge funds 24,51% 75,49% 20,58% 79,42% 24,35% 75,65% 
Private equity 13,51% 86,49% 12,50% 87,50% 66,67% 33,33% 
Venture capital funds 21,05% 78,95% 12,50% 87,50% 20,00% 80,00% 
Pension funds 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 
Banks & trusts 3,57% 96,43% 13,33% 86,67% 12,09% 87,91% 
Research firms 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
1 
 ‘impatient’ investors have a portfolio holding period of less than 24 months. ‘Patient investors have a holding period of more than 24 months. 
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Table 3: the good and bad side of institutional investors (Blundell-Bond system 
dynamic estimation, panel of 324 European companies over 2002-2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 rdtoassets rdtoassets rdtoassets 
  (demand & financial 
variables included) 
(scale variables 
winsorized) 
rdtoassetst-1 0.504*** 0.477*** 0.478*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0652) (0.0702) 
Tobinq 0.00299 0.00327 0.00236 
 (0.00416) (0.00396) (0.00407) 
salestoassets  0.0301*** 0.0381*** 
  (0.00905) (0.0104) 
lemployees -0.00699 -0.0158** -0.0102 
 (0.00655) (0.00756) (0.00671) 
rost-1 0.00978*** 0.00886*** 0.00956*** 
 (0.00252) (0.00291) (0.00259) 
duii 0.0372* 0.0347* 0.0411* 
 (0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0211) 
impatientstake -0.00280** -0.00331** -0.00316** 
 (0.00138) (0.00131) (0.00149) 
hightech 0.105** 0.0696* 0.125*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0373) (0.0479) 
latin 0.0800 0.0727* 0.104* 
 (0.0583) (0.0429) (0.0621) 
german 0.0914 0.0451 0.110 
 (0.0653) (0.0437) (0.0725) 
nordic -0.00603 -0.00931 -0.00530 
 (0.0497) (0.0413) (0.0530) 
debttoinc  -0.0000302  
  (0.0000383)  
cashtoinc  0.0000386  
  (0.0000337)  
divtoincome  0.000158  
  (0.000485)  
buybacktoinc  0.00273  
  (0.00410)  
Observations 1874 1873 1874 
Arellano-Bond tests for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced 
errors 
H0: no order 1 
autocorrelation 
p = 0.048 p = 0.051 P = 0.054 
H0: no order 2 
autocorrelation 
p = 0.570 p = 0.384 p = 0.594 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
H0: overidentifying 
restrictions are valid 
p = 0.336 p = 0.131 p = 0.626 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models estimated with time-period fixed 
effects and a constant. Coefficients, robust standard errors and p values of the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
are obtained after a one step system-GMM estimation. The Sargan statistic is computed with the two step system-
GMM estimation results. The instrumented variables are duinvins, partshortterm and rost-1 (treated as 
predetermined). 
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Table 4: interacting ownership effects with firm size (system dynamic estimation, 
panel of 324 companies over 2002-2009) 
(1) Interacting ownership with size 
 
(2) Testing the non linearity of the impatient capital effect 
 
 rdtoassets  rdtoassets 
rdtoassetst-1 0.476*** rdtoassetst-1 0.493*** 
 (0.0654)  (0.0646) 
tobinq1 0.00239 tobinq1 0.00247 
 (0.00390)  (0.00406) 
salestoassets 0.0341*** salestoassets 0.0337*** 
 (0.00921)  (0.00964) 
lemployees -0.00961 lemployees -0.0147** 
 (0.00760)  (0.00614) 
rost-1 0.00760** rost-1 0.00926*** 
 (0.00337)  (0.00277) 
dbig×duii 0.0358** duii 0.0368** 
 (0.0173)  (0.0182) 
(1−dbig)×duii 0.0450**   
 (0.0199)   
dbig×impatientstake 0.000173 (1−dhighturnov)×impatientstake -0.0034 
 (0.00154)  (0.00835) 
(1−dbig)×impatientstake -0.00335*** dhighturnov×impatientstake -0.00282** 
 (0.00123)  (0.00133) 
hightech 0.0905*** hightech 0.0802*** 
 (0.0249)  (0.0307) 
latin3 0.0392 latin3 0.0788* 
 (0.0336)  (0.0461) 
german2 0.0356 german2 0.0770* 
 (0.0260)  (0.0462) 
nordic -0.0135 nordic -0.00206 
 (0.0326)  (0.0411) 
Observations 1874 Observations 1874 
Arellano-Bond tests for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors 
H0: no order 1 
autocorrelation 
p = 0.033  p = 0.050 
H0: no order 2 
autocorrelation 
p = 0.648  p = 0.570 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
H0: overidentifying 
restrictions are valid 
p = 0.753  p = 0.433 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All models estimated with time-period fixed 
effects and a constant. Coefficients, robust standard errors and p values of the Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 
are obtained after a one step system-GMM estimation. The Sargan statistic is computed with the two step system-
GMM estimation results. The instrumented variables are (1−dbig)×duii, dbig×duii, dbig×impatientstake, 
(1−dbig)×impatientstake, rost-1 (treated as predetermined) in the first equation, and duii, dhighturnov × 
impatientstake, (1−dhighturnov)×impatientstake and rost-1 (treated as predetermined) in the second equation. 
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2-digits SIC Sectors Frequence Percentage 4-digits SIC Most frequent sectors Frequence Percentage
1 Agricultural production 8 0.32 7372 Prepackaged software 197 7.80
10 Metal mining 38 1.50 2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 153 6.06
13 Oil and gas 29 1.15 3674 Semiconductors & related devices 101 4.00
14 Nonmetallic Minerals 8 0.32 3663 Radio & TV broadcasting equipment 69 2.73
15 General Building Contractors 12 0.48 3714 Motor vehicule parts & accessories 64 2.53
16 Heavy Construction, Except Building 8 0.32 4813 Telephone communications except radio 64 2.53
20 Food and kindred products 104 4.12 3711 Motor vehicules & passenger car bodies 47 1.86
21 Tobacco Products 16 0.63 3845 Electromedical/Therapeutic apparatus 46 1.82
23 Apparel & Other Textile Products 8 0.32 3679 Electronic components Nec 42 1.66
24 Lumber & Wood Products 7 0.28 3559 Special industry machinery Nec 37 1.47
25 Furniture & Fixtures 8 0.32
26 Paper & Allied Products 24 0.95
27 Printing & Publishing 16 0.63
28 Chemicals and allied products 336 13.31
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 24 0.95
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastic products 64 2.53
32 Stone, clay and glass products 56 2.22
33 Primary metal industries 80 3.17
34 fabricated metal products 64 2.53
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 301 11.92
36 Electronic and electric equipment 346 13.70
37 Transportation equipment 199 7.88
38 Instruments and related products 195 7.72
39 Misc. Manuf. Industries 16 0.63
45 Transportation by Air 16 0.63
47 Transportation Services 8 0.32
48 Communication 104 4.12
49 Electric, gas and sanitary services 67 2.65
50 Wholesale trade 32 1.27
51 Wholesale Trade- Nondurable Goods 8 0.32
62 Security & Commodity Brokers 8 0.32
73 Business services 283 11.21
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 8 0.32
87 Engineering & Management Services 24 0.95
Total 2533 100.00
APPENDIX : Table A1. Sectoral distribution of  the sample and most frequent sectors at the 4-digits level
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APPENDIX: Table A2: Distribution of firms size in the sample
Sales Total asset
Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 2.02e+07 1119000 1% 2.59e+07 9015044
5% 4.54e+07 1404000 5% 6.10e+07 9164707
10% 8.81e+07 1918000 10% 1.12e+08 1.35e+07
25% 2.69e+08 3362000 25% 2.68e+08 1.46e+07
50% 1.23e+09 50% 1.21e+09
Largest Largest
75% 5.78e+09 2.41e+11 75% 7.07e+09 2.19e+11
90% 2.03e+10 2.46e+11 90% 2.97e+10 2.35e+11
95% 4.23e+10 2.55e+11 95% 6.13e+10 2.35e+11
99% 1.09e+11 2.57e+11 99% 1.62e+11 2.62e+11
Market capitalization Employees
Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 2.07e+07 3838618 1% 137 56
5% 4.89e+07 3864007 5% 290 60
10% 9.52e+07 4660554 10% 475 62
25% 2.72e+08 7557031 25% 1633 67
50% 1.07e+09 50% 6130
Largest Largest
75% 5.07e+09 1.67e+11 75% 26797 488518
90% 2.18e+10 1.76e+11 90% 77371 507641
95% 4.56e+10 1.77e+11 95% 121723 511292
99% 1.05e+11 1.77e+11 99% 321090 524803
 
 
APPENDIX. Table A3. Sample's country distribution  
Country Frequency % of firms in the 
sample 
Relative size of the 
country1 
U.K. 608 24.08 14,69 
Germany 557 22.06 19,20 
France 346 13.70 14,78 
Sweden 206 8.16 2,13 
Finland 185 7.33 1,23 
Netherlands 128 5.07 3,86 
Denmark 125 4.95 1,30 
Belgium 98 3.88 2,58 
Italy 83 3.29 14,12 
Austria 72 2.85 1,93 
Spain 48 1.90 10,83 
Ireland 39 1.54 1,09 
Greece 15 0.59 2,65 
Poland 8 0.32 9,01 
Luxembourg 7 0.28 0,12 
TOTAL 2,525 100.00  
1
 % of the country's population in the total population of the sample's countries 
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i
 See Acs & Audretsch (1987) and Mazzucato (2000) for a discussion of the hypothesis that innovation activity is 
promoted by large firms. See Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen (1988), Himmelberg & Petersen (1994), Hall (2002), 
O’Sullivan (2004) and Brown, Fazzari, Petersen (2009) for surveys on financing constraints and innovative 
investments. 
ii
 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer (1999) for a survey on conflicts of interests between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. 
iii
 Institutional investors hold more than 60% of publicly traded equity since the 2000’s in the U.S. (Aghion et al, 
2010). 
iv
 Activism refers to actions taken by institutional investors to pressure managers (public announcements, 
shareholder proposals, proxy contests, direct negotiations with managers, etc. (David et al., 2001). 
v
 State or family capitalism. 
vi
 Proposals are often targeted at companies that have underperformed their peers and can include i) redeem a 
company’s poison pill; ii) replace directors; iii) separate the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer, iv) create a compensation committee, etc. See Black (1998), Del Guercio & Hawkins (1999), 
Gillian & Starks (2000). 
vii
 In particular, we are not able to analyse the influence of pension funds or ‘grey’ investors on R&D. Pension 
funds have too small direct shareholdings in companies and the category ‘grey’ investors overlap the category 
‘strategic’ investors (we explain this point in paragraph 3.). 
viii
 An alternative source of European R&D data is Eurostat statistics on Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD), 
but this is aggregated data that cannot be used for firm-level studies. Moreover, BERD figures include all R&D 
expenses whereas the EU Scoreboard R&D figures only include the R&D financed by companies from their own 
funds. 
ix
 The Scoreboard allocates each company’s total R&D investment to the country in which the company has its 
registered office. 
x
 Any company that is not ranked in Scoreboard for a single year between 2004 and 2009 is excluded from the 
sample. 
xi
 Because we merge these data with ownership data that are not available before 2002, we cannot exploit years 
2000 and 2001. 
xii
 We fill out the missing figures through annual financial reports. Ownership information from the TOBO 
database is the ownership at the end of the calendar year, but for other financial variables we consider the fiscal 
year-end month because it is also the methodology used to produce R&D figures in the EU Scoreboard. 
Consequently, fiscal years ending between January 1st and May 31st are considered as ending in the prior 
calendar year. For example, the data for a fiscal year beginning on June 1st, 2008 and ending on May 31st, 2009 
is reported as the year 2008, whereas a fiscal year beginning on July 1st, 2008 and ending on June 30th, 2009 is 
reported as the year 2009.  
xiii
 See Hall (2002) for a survey on the financing of R&D investment. 
xiv
 We also tested equations with R&D/sales as the dependent variable, and the results proved much less robust 
than in the case of R&D/assets. A plausible explanation is that sales are more volatile than the book value of 
assets, which is supported by the much higher standard error of the R&D-to-sales ratio than the R&D-to-assets 
ratio (Table 1). The influence of ownership characteristics may consequently be hidden by sales volatility when 
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one measures the R&D effort by R&D-to-sales ratios. The R&D-over-assets ratio is a more structural measure of 
a firm’s R&D effort, reflecting the long term R&D policy of the firm. It is therefore more responsive to 
structural ownership characteristics. It also appears to be more reactive to long-term determinants such as the 
technological level or the country group effect. The number of employees is a measure of firms’ size only in 
labour-intensive industrial sectors. 
xv
 For these country group dummies, the reference is therefore uk which is the dummy for English or Irish 
companies. 
xvi
 We use log (employees) in the regressions while it appears in level in Table 1. 
xvii
 The Blundell-Bond estimator is also preferred to the Arellano-Bond version because it has greater precision 
when the time dimension of the sample is small and the true value of the parameter β1 is large. 
xviii
 Results of such static specification can be provided on demand. 
xix
 Showing this directly in the estimates with crossed dummies proved impossible because the category 
‘strategic’ and the category ‘impatient’ investors is too small: too few ownership structures are dominated by 
‘impatient’ investors. 
